Eiendommen til Saugbrugs er interessant Bare en smule mer lesbar, ASA I. Innlegg av: Skogens (17.02.17 18:26 ), lest 4025 ganger Bedre tider for Saugbrugs – Hva med 2017 for Saugbrugs? – Saugbrugs har bidratt bra til det resultatet. Vi oppgir ikke spesifikke tall for Saugbrugs utover pressemeldingen og kvartalsrapporten, sier han. – Vi valgte Ringstad fordi de har lang erfaring med å skape nytt liv i tidligere fabrikklokaler. Vi har bygningene og de har kunnskapen. Måten for eksempel den tidligere skofabrikken på Sørhalden er restaurert og tatt i ny bruk, har vært bra for både området og for Halden, sier Henrik Bjørneby som leder arbeidet fra Saugbrugs sin side. Endret: 17.02.17 19:10 Det sier både prosjektdirektør Egil Olsen i Østfold fylkeskommune og leder Per Forsstrøm i Haldens Svømmeklub. SC paper market will see a capacity reduction of 600,000 tpy in 2017 Stora Enso said that the closure of PM 8 in Kvarnsveden would reduce the company's overall European SC paper capacities by 9%. However, the group pointed out that this would not impact its SC paper offering as it continued to produce SC paper at the site's PM 12 (capacity of 400,000 tpy) as well as at PM 6 and PM 8 at the Maxau mill in Germany (260,000 tpy and 270,000 tpy) and at PM 3 in the Langerbrugge mill in Belgium (155,000 tpy). The group also serves its SC paper customers from the Dawang mill in China (140,000 tpy). Bidrar bra i Norske Skog
– Det er investert150 millioner kroner i et biogassanlegg, som starter i mars/april og vil gi metangass til blant annet kjøretøy, sier han. Innlegg av: bolsa (03.03.17 11:02 ), lest 1699 ganger Det er i tillegg et betydelig omland til bygningene. Norske Skog Saugbrugs og Ringstad Næringsutvikling tilbyr bygg og areal med det de mener er en fornuftig ressursutnyttelse, noe som de også tror kan gi en god økonomisk løsning for Halden kommune. De mener at de kan tilby en helhetlig løsning på Nordsiden som ivaretar byens industrihistorie. Regelverket i krisehåndteringsdirektivet er meget omfattende, detaljert og forholdsvis uoversiktlig og komplisert. Lovteknisk er direktivet utformet på en måte som avviker ganske vesentlig fra norsk finanslovgivning og regelverket om solvenssvikt og offentlig administrasjon i finansforetaksloven kapittel 21. Tilpasningen av norsk lovgivning til de krav som følger av direktivet roulette strategy 360, har derfor vært en meget viktig del av lovarbeidet her. Det er i den sammenheng lagt vekt på å få frem hovedlinjene i regelverket. En eventuell utbygging og detaljregulering kan fastsettes gjennom forskrift. Chapter 19 of the Financial Institutions Act relating to the Norwegian Banks’ Guarantee Fund has already been adapted to the requirements stipulated in previous EU directives on guarantee schemes for bank deposits. This applies first and foremost to Directive 94/19/EC. In the new EU Directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes (2014/49/EU) (the «DGSD»), the requirements for national legislation in previous directives have largely been continued, but an editing of the text based on a new approach means that the directive still appears new. Therefore, the need for a Norwegian adaptation – in addition to certain substantive amendments – has, first and foremost, required technical and editorial amendments for Chapter 19 of the Financial Institutions Act to formally and systematically correspond to the regulatory framework in the new DGSD. On the whole roulette house edge, the rules in Chapter 19 of the Draft Bill represent a continuation of some of the rules and principles in Chapter 19 of the Financial Institutions Act and the implementation of the provisions in the Directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes (2014/49/EU). Each institution and financial group shall prepare a contingency plan that stipulates the measures that can be initiated and implemented in the event of different envisaged instances of weakened economic and financial positions to remedy the institution’s capital deficiencies without public financial support. The latter proviso is also an objective that the BRRD places considerable emphasis on. The contingency plan must be sent to the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway for it to be determined whether the planned measures will be sufficient for remedying the institution’s capital deficiencies. If necessary, the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway will require that the plan be revised, cf. Section 20-6 of the Draft Bill. Innskuddsgarantiordningens midler kan foruten å benyttes til dekning av garanterte innskudd, benyttes til alternative tidligtiltak, dersom dette vil gjøre at den aktuelle banken ikke trenger å innstille sin virksomhet, jf. lovutkastet § 19-11 annet ledd. Det er i tråd med innskuddsgarantidirektivet knyttet en rekke vilkår og begrensninger til slik bruk av ordningens midler. Direktivet stiller krav til medlemsstatenes garantiordninger som har til formål å harmonisere statenes lovgivning om garantiordninger for bankinnskudd, men bygger som nevnt på regler i tidligere EU-direktiver. Regelverket om Bankenes sikringsfond oppfyller derfor de fleste av de kravene som følger av det nye EU-direktivet. Det stilles imidlertid nye særlige krav om at de enkelte medlemsstater skal bygge opp et innskuddsgarantifond for å ha midler til å dekke mulig garantiansvar. Uavhengig av dette skal fondets midler fortsatt kunne benyttes til ulike støttetiltak ved soliditetssvikt i banker forut for offentlig administrasjon. For øvrig skal bankinnskudd i tilfelle av insolvens i banker også sikres prioritet i forhold til vanlige kreditorer (innskuddspreferanse), jf. krisehåndteringsdirektivet artikkel 108. Dette har reelt sett medført en endring i forhold til prioritetsreglene i dekningsloven, se lovutkastet § 20-29. Seniorrådgiver Lise Ljungmann Haugen, hovedsekretær Deler av direktivet har imidlertid også til formål å få gjennomført regler om beredskapsplaner og andre forhåndstiltak som kan hindre at det vil oppstå krisesituasjoner i europeiske banker, kredittforetak, verdipapirforetak og finanskonsern. Direktivet inneholder også enkelte bestemmelser om tidligtiltak ved soliditetssvikt som er innarbeidet som supplement til de allerede gjeldende bestemmelsene om tidligtiltak i finansforetaksloven kapittel 21 avsnitt I. Det har likevel vist seg behov for en gjennomgang av reglene om tidligtiltak ved soliditetssvikt i finansforetaksloven kapittel 21 avsnitt I, blant annet med sikte på modernisering og tilpasninger til enkelte bestemmelser om beredskaps- og tidligtiltak i krisehåndteringsdirektivet. Krisehåndteringsdirektivets regler om soliditetssvikt og myndighetsstyrt administrasjon av foretak i banksektoren er i hovedsak basert på prinsipper som også ligger til grunn for gjeldende lovregler i finansforetaksloven kapittel 21. Direktivets regelverk fremtrer likevel – ikke minst i omfang og detaljeringsgrad – som ganske forskjellig fra de forholdsvis knappe norske lovreglene. Norsk tilpasning til direktivet krever derfor først og fremst en redaksjonell og systematisk omarbeiding og utbygging av lovverket, samt en tilpasning til enkelte nye elementer i direktivet. Det vesentlige nye er 1) reglene om beredskaps- og krisetiltaksplaner, 2) regler om nedskrivning eller konvertering til egenkapital av ansvarlig kapital og vanlige fordringer («bail-in»), og 3) etablering av et nasjonalt krisefond. Når det gjelder sammenhengen mellom direktivene, vises det til avsnitt 5.6 nedenfor. Norwegian law places considerable emphasis on safeguarding normal depositors through a good and, in part, extensive deposit guarantee scheme. This has meant that when formulating the Draft Bill, emphasis has been placed on that the scope or flexibility the directive provides in these areas should be fully exploited. It is noted there that, for a number of deposits, including deposits relating to client accounts, transfer of real estate and compensation payments, the stipulated limit does not apply. These deposits are considered to be guaranteed in their entirety for a period of 12 months from when the deposit was received, cf. Section 19-6 of the Draft Bill. Reference is made to the fact that the deposit guarantee scheme also includes deposits of funds linked to individual pension schemes or group occupational pension schemes for small and medium-sized enterprises, cf. Section 19-5, paragraph two of the Draft Bill. Hovedformålet med innskuddsgarantiordningen er å sikre at innskudd som er mottatt av medlemsforetak, blir utbetalt dersom banken er ute av stand til å tilbakebetale innskudd ved forfall norsk automat company, jf. lovutkastet § 19-3. Banker med hovedsete her i riket, skal være medlemmer av innskuddsgarantiordningen, jf. utkastet § 19-1. Dette omfatter også innskudd mottatt av banken gjennom filial etablert i annen EØS-stat og ved annen grensekryssende virksomhet innenfor EØS-området. Kredittinstitusjoner med hovedsete i annen EØS-stat som er etablert her i riket gjennom filial, kan bli medlem av innskuddsgarantiordningen i den grad hjemstatens garantiordning ikke gir innskyterne like god dekning som den norske ordningen, jf. lovutkastet § 19-2 annet ledd. Nestleder Bente Øverli (Forbrukerombudet) The majority of the provisions in the directive apply to the actual formulation of the guarantee scheme’s guarantee liability for repayment of bank deposits. The requirements stipulated in the new DGSD have resulted in the need for certain substantive amendments in current law. Regardless of these factors norsk online casino is it legal, emphasis is also placed on, as part of the adaptation to the new directive, carrying out an editorial and systematic review of the entire regulatory framework relating to deposit guarantees. The BRRD’s rules concerning infringement of capital requirements and government controlled administration of institutions in the bank sector are largely based on principles that also form the basis for applicable legal rules in Chapter 21 of the Financial Institutions Act. The regulatory framework in the directive is still – not least in terms of scope and level of detail – rather different to the comparatively small number of Norwegian legal rules. Therefore, Norwegian adaptation to the directive requires, first and foremost, editing and systematic revision and expansion of the legislative framework and an adjustment to certain new elements in the directive. The most important new elements are: (1) the rules governing contingency plans and resolution plans, (2) the rules governing the write down or conversion to equity of relevant capital instruments and eligible liabilities («bail-in tool»), and (3) the establishment of a national resolution fund. Sentralt står da finanskonsern hvor (hoved)morselskapet er norsk. I så fall foreligger grenseoverskridende virksomhet dersom gruppen også omfatter et konsernforetak med filial i annen EØS-stat, eller et konsernforetak som er etablert i annen EØS-stat for å drive virksomhet der. Her oppstår det spørsmål om norsk krisehåndteringsmyndighets rolle i forhold til den norske gruppens virksomhet i annen EØS-stat, i tillegg til de spørsmål som gjelder krisehåndtering av gruppen i sin helhet i Norge. Part VII «Protection for owners, creditors and other contracting parties» stipulates rules for different forms of legal protection for shareholders, creditors and other contracting parties when carrying out different resolution actions. Resolution is a form of loss distribution between different parties and the rules for such protection are therefore important. This involves different forms for protecting the acquired right to the institution’s assets, rights and liabilities through the implementation of resolution actions. The provisions therefore entail restrictions on the powers of the resolution authority, whereby the authority cannot immediately initiate the resolution actions referred to in Parts V and VI of the Draft Bill. However, parts of the directive also have the objective of implementing rules for contingency plans and other early intervention measures that can prevent a crisis situation from occurring in European banks, credit institutions, investment firms and financial groups. The directive also contains certain provisions regarding early intervention measures in the event of capital deficiencies that are incorporated as a supplement to the already applicable provisions regarding early intervention in Chapter 21 Part I of the Financial Institutions Act. There has still proven to be a need for a review of the rules governing early intervention in the event of capital deficiencies in Chapter 21 Part I of the Financial Institutions Act, including with the aim of modernising and adapting to certain provisions regarding contingency and early intervention measures in the BRRD. After the institution is placed under public administration, the resolution authority shall make a decision about whether the institution (1) shall be subject to resolution with a view to continuing critical financial services and limiting the harmful effects to customer groups, the public or the economy, or (2) shall be liquidated because there is no basis for the institution to continue operations, cf. Section 20-27 of the Draft Bill. Therefore, the BRRD differentiates between resolution through resolution actions and normal insolvency proceedings that have the intention of liquidating the institution. An important condition for resolution to be decided is that there are public interests that warrant the institution being subject to resolution pursuant to Part V of the Draft Bill. Liquidation will largely follow the rules and principles pertaining to bankruptcy law, including the priority rules in the Creditors Recovery Act. Another aspect of the rules include protection for different financial collateral, set-off and netting arrangements so as to prevent the splitting or changes to contracts linked to such arrangements during resolution, cf. Sections 20-54 to 20-57 of the Draft Bill. In addition, in accordance with the BBRD, rules have been included regarding appeals and legal action in connection with decisions on early intervention mesures and resolution actions. See Section 20-59 of the Draft Bill. These are rules that ensure owners, creditors, contracting parties and other parties linked to the institution are entitled to appeal and to judicial review. The BRRD’s requirements for national legislation are largely formulated as minimum requirements. A state is therefore not entitled to uphold rules that are contrary to the minimum requirements, but may, as a general rule, adopt additional or stricter rules, cf. Article 1, no. 2 of the directive. The Banking Law Commission has not generally seen the need for such national additions and has therefore only used this scope or flexibility to a limited extent. See section 5.4.2 below. Chapter 19 of the Draft Bill will apply instead of the current Chapter 19 of the Financial Institutions Act. For the institutions that come under the scope of Chapter 20 of the Draft Bill, this Chapter 20 will apply instead of the rules in Chapter 21 of the Financial Institutions Act. See Section 20-1 of the Draft Bill. It is otherwise expected that applicable provisions regarding entry into force and transitional provisions in Sections 23-1 and 23-2 of the Financial Institutions Act will apply correspondingly for the provisions in Chapters 19 and 20 of the Draft Bill. This also enables separate deadlines to be set for when certain provisions in the Draft Bill shall apply. This must otherwise be coordinated with the preparation of regulatory provisions to complement some of the provisions in the Draft Bill. Regulations that are already established pursuant to Chapters 19 and 21 of the Financial Institutions Act will continue to apply until otherwise decided. Før myndigheten treffer vedtak etter utkastet §§ 20-20 og 20-21 om nedskrivning eller konvertering til egenkapital av ansvarlig kapital, vedtak etter utkastet § 20-27 om at et foretak skal undergis krisehåndtering, eller vedtak om krisetiltak etter reglene i utkastet avsnitt V, skal krisehåndteringsmyndigheten sørge for å få gjennomført en verdivurdering av foretakets eiendeler og forpliktelser norge casino vacations, jf. lovutkastet § 20-22. Denne vil være et sentralt grunnlag for krisehåndteringsmyndighetens videre vurderinger og beslutninger i saken. Direktør Stefi Kierulf Prytz (Finans Norge) Professor dr. juris Erling Selvig, leder (Universitetet i Oslo) During the legislative work it was accepted that adapting legislation to the directive will require the preparation of a separate legislative framework for resolution of banks, credit institutions, investment firms and holding companies of groups. The new legislative framework for government controlled resolution for these types of institutions has been principally formulated in such a way that it will largely replace otherwise applicable rules for such institutions and groups concerning capital deficiencies and public administration in Chapter 21 Part II of the Financial Institutions Act. This has resulted in the extensive development of Norwegian legislation in this area so that the requirements for national legislation in the extensive and detailed regulatory framework in the BRRD will be satisfied. When viewed in relation to Norwegian law, the BRRD entails significant changes in two principal areas. Firstly, an important element in the directive’s regulatory framework is a set of rules that grant the authority the right to – as part of the restructuring of an insolvent institution and its capital base – make decisions regarding the write down or conversion to equity, partly of the institution’s relevant capital instruments in the form of approved tier 1 capital or approved tier 2 capital and partly of claims against the institution that accrue to financial creditors. However, the so-called bail-in system shall be implemented in accordance with the priority rules that largely correspond with the rules in the Creditors Recovery Act. Reference is also made to that many forms of liabilities are exempted from the bail-in tool. The extent of loss absorbing capital is therefore an important element in the system, also in consideration that risk-weighted capital is higher than the unweighted capital of the institutions. The resolution fund shall primarily be built up through contributions from banks and credit institutions with a Norwegian license. The total annual contribution shall represent 0.1 per cent of the total guaranteed deposits in the banks, cf. Section 20-66 of the Draft Bill. With regard to the size of the contribution, reference is made to the discussions in sections 7.2 to 7.4 below. The calculation of each bank’s contribution shall be made according to relatively complicated rules in accordance with the BRRD’s requirements and the Commission Regulation issued pursuant to this, cf. Section 20-67 of the Draft Bill. The amounts in the resolution fund shall be managed by the Norwegian Banks’ Guarantee Fund, cf. Section 20-72 of the Draft Bill, but allocated by the resolution authority. Reference is otherwise made to the remarks concerning the importance of introducing a resolution fund in addition to a deposit guarantee fund in section 1.4.1 above. Innskuddsgarantiordningens ansvar oppstår når foretaket er satt under offentlig administrasjon eller Finanstilsynet har besluttet at en bank ikke har tilbakebetalt et forfalt innskudd, og banken er i en slik økonomisk stilling at den hverken er eller vil bli i stand til å foreta slik tilbakebetaling. Hovedregelen er at Bankenes sikringsfond skal gjøre garanterte innskudd tilgjengelig for innskyterne innen syv arbeidsdager etter dette tidspunktet – noe som må regnes som en kort frist i en slik sammenheng, jf. lovutkastet § 19-8. Secondly, further measures could be necessary if it transpires that there is a material breach of statutory requirements for relevant capital instruments, liquid assets or adequate business operations, cf. Section 20-15 of the Draft Bill, supplemented by Sections 20-16 to 20-18 of the Draft Bill. The Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway can then order the board to initiate measures in accordance with, among other things, the contingency plan and resolution plan, investigate possibilities for negotiated solutions with owners, creditors and other private parties, arrange for the write down or conversion to equity of the institution’s relevant capital instruments and convene the institution’s general meeting in accordance with the specific rules that are described in the supplementary sections. In addition, the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway can ensure that a temporary administrator is appointed, cf. Section 20-18 of the Draft Bill. If board duties and decision-making authority are transferred to a temporary administrator, this will result in corresponding restrictions on the powers of the board. Depending on the circumstances, this may be similar to the effects of public administration pursuant to Section 20-26 of the Draft Bill. Avsnitt VI «Tilleggsbeføyelser» inneholder bestemmelser som gir krisehåndteringsmyndigheten nødvendige tilleggshjemler og -kompetanse til å sørge for at krisetiltakene kan gjennomføres på en effektiv måte. Det er i hovedsak overlatt til krisehåndteringsmyndigheten å avgjøre ved forvaltningsskjønn om det i enkelttilfelle skal gis slike pålegg som tilleggsbeføyelsene omhandler. De skranker for myndighetsutøvelsen som følger av reglene i utkastet avsnitt VII om vern, må imidlertid overholdes. Advokat/fagsjef Camilla Forgaard Rukin (Hovedorganisasjonen Virke) Before the authority makes a decision pursuant to Sections 20-20 and 20-21 of the Draft Bill regarding the write down or conversion to equity of relevant capital instruments, a decision pursuant to Section 20-27 of the Draft Bill about whether an institution shall be subject to resolution, or a decision regarding resolution actions pursuant to the rules in Part V, the resolution authority must ensure to conduct a valuation of the institution’s assets and liabilities, cf. Section 20-22 of the Draft Bill. This will be an important basis for the resolution authority’s continued assessments and decisions relating to the matter. Før det iverksettes krisetiltak er en viktig forutsetning at foretakets ansvarlige lånekapital som omfattes av reglene i utkastet §§ 20-20 og 20-21, blir nedskrevet for å dekke tap og i tilfelle konvertert til egenkapital før eller samtidig med anvendelsen av krisetiltak som vil medføre tap for kreditorer, herunder tap som følge av at fordringer nedskrives eller konverteres til egenkapital, se lovutkastet § 20-31. Parts of the rules in Part III of the Draft Bill are based on there being consultation between the institution and the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway in connection with the assessment and implementation of the different early intervention measures. It is also the institution that shall implement these measures. The measures have been graded such that the more serious an intervention a measure is for the institution and its owners, the more serious the institution’s situation must be. Based on this, the rules governing early intervention are linked to three different stages of capital deficiencies and solvency failure. Firstly, if the institution’s position must be deemed to be significantly weakened, the institution must prepare an action plan that identifies the measures that are necessary for remedying the institution’s capital deficiencies, cf. Section 20-12 of the Draft Bill. The action plan will be linked to the specific, existing economic and financial situation of the institution and the problems that this creates. If the institution does not do this at its own initiative, the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway can order that an action plan is prepared. The Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway and the institution shall then, in consultation, discuss the plan and determine what measures have to be initiated, cf. Section 20-13 of the Draft Bill. The Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway can also require that a status report is prepared, cf. Section 20-14 of the Draft Bill. This status report will provide an updated status of the institution’s assets and liabilities and will form an important starting point for further potential measures. The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (2014/59/EU) (the «BRRD») contains a new and extremely extensive regulatory framework relating to government controlled resolution – public administration – in the event of solvency failure by banks, credit institutions and important investment firms, as well as parent institutions in groups that include such institutions. The directive, which is relevant to the EEA, sets very comprehensive and elaborate requirements for national legislation relating to government management of insolvency in such institutions and groups. The directive must have been implemented into the legislation of the member states with effect from 1 January 2015. However, for Section 5 in Chapter IV of Title IV of the directive regarding the write down and conversion of eligible liabilities to equity, the final deadline is 1 January 2016, cf. Article 130, no. 1, paragraph three of the BRRD. The BRRD is relevant to the EEA, but issues associated with the actual inclusion of the directive in the EEA Agreement have yet to be formally clarified. For the EEA states that are not part of the EU, there will, in all instances, be a separate implementation deadline stipulated by the EEA Joint Committee when this has been done. The relationship to the EEA Agreement is referred to in more detail in chapter 4 below. Ved utbetaling fra garantiordningen vil ordningen tre inn i innskyternes rett overfor medlemsforetaket i samsvar med det garanterte innskudd og med samme prioritet som innskyteren, jf. lovutkastet § 19-12. Part IV «Public administration» represents, in many ways, a type of introductory section to the different resolution actions that can be initiated in accordance with the directive (Part V of the Draft Bill). This stipulates that if there is no reasonable prospect that early intervention measures, private support measures, measures from the supervisory authority or the write down or conversion to equity of relevant capital instruments may prevent the institution having to or being expected to, in the near future, cease operations, the resolution authority will place the institution under public administration, cf. Section 20-23 of the Draft Bill. It is a requirement for the decision that there is no reasonable prospect that the financial basis for continued operations can be attained in some other manner. The BRRD applies for the entire EU area. For institutions in states outside of the Eurozone, the national authorities of the home state must still be responsible for managing bank crises. It is expected that, when putting the regulatory framework into practice, the national authorities will also take into consideration guidelines and recommendations prepared by the European Banking Authority (EBA) in accordance with the work tasks assigned to the EBA in the directive itself and in EBA Regulation (EU), no. 1093/2010. As an extension of the European Central Bank’s Single Supervisory Mechanisms (SSM), a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) has been established for banks, credit institutions and groups in states within the Eurozone that shall be responsible for resolution of individual institutions pursuant to the provisions in the directive (EU Regulation no. 806/2014). Part VIII «Financial groups with cross-border activities» addresses rules pertaining to resolution of groups with cross-border activities. The regulatory framework is based on Title V of the BRRD. However, in the Draft Bill the implementation of these rules is restricted to provisions that deal with financial groups with Norwegian affiliation and which can raise issues associated with Norwegian resolution authority and cooperation with authorities in other EEA states. Grupper med (hoved)morselskap i annen EØS-stat vil i hovedsak bli krisehåndtert i den stat hvor morselskapet i finanskonsernet er etablert, og etter lovgivningen der. Her oppstår «norske» spørsmål bare dersom gruppen har virksomhet i Norge som drives gjennom et konsernforetak etablert i annen EØS-stat med filial etablert her i riket, eller et norsketablert konsernforetak for virksomhet her i riket. Norsketablerte konsernforetak som er morselskap i et finansielt delkonsern for virksomheten her i riket, vil for øvrig også reise spørsmål i norsk sammenheng. Something that is new as a result of the BRRD is that the public administration is conducted by a separate resolution authority. Pursuant to Section 20-3 of the Draft Bill, the Ministry of Finance is the resolution authority, however this authority can be delegated to the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway. However, it is then assumed that organisational divisions shall be established between the supervisory activities of the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway and its duties as resolution authority. The resolution authority is also assigned duties and responsibilities relating to preventive and contingency measures in the form of preparing resolution plans for the individual institutions and will therefore also be in operation prior to resolution situations. Etter at foretaket er satt under offentlig administrasjon, skal krisehåndteringsmyndigheten fatte en beslutning om hvorvidt foretaket 1) skal undergis krisehåndtering med sikte på videreføring av kritiske finansielle tjenester og begrensning av virkninger til skade for kundegrupper, det offentlige eller samfunnsøkonomien, eller 2) skal avvikles fordi det ikke foreligger grunnlag for videre drift i foretaket, jf. lovutkastet § 20-27. Krisehåndteringsdirektivet skiller således mellom krisehåndtering gjennom iverksettelse av krisetiltak og vanlig insolvensbehandling som har til formål å avvikle foretaket. Et vesentlig vilkår for at det kan besluttes krisehåndtering er at det foreligger offentlige interesser som tilsier at foretaket skal underlegges krisehåndtering etter lovutkastet avsnitt V. En avvikling vil i all hovedsak følge konkursrettslige regler og prinsipper, herunder dekningslovens prioritetsregler. Banklovkommisjonen har i tilknytning til arbeidet med utredningen, organisert sitt arbeid på samme måte som ved utarbeidelsen av flere av sine tidligere utredninger, herunder etablering av en arbeidsgruppe med deltakere fra berørte interesseorganisasjoner og myndigheter, se også avsnitt 2.6 nedenfor. Ved sluttføring av lovarbeidet har også Sverre Dyrhaug som er tilknyttet Finans Norge, blitt trukket inn i Banklovkommisjonens arbeid som følge av hans erfaringer og kunnskap om bankkriser og banksikringslovgivningen. Juridisk direktør Marius Ryel (Norges Bank) Seksjonssjef Runa Kristiane Sæther (Finanstilsynet) Avdelingsdirektør Erling G. Rikheim (Finansdepartementet) For at Banklovkommisjonen skulle få et best mulig grunnlag for vurdering av de viktigste spørsmål knyttet til utformingen av utkastet til den nye lovgivningen på finansområdet, ble det tidlig i lovarbeidet etablert en bredt sammensatt arbeidsgruppe med representanter for de berørte interessegrupperinger. Seniorrådgiver Egil Rokhaug (Barne-, likestillings- og inkluderingsdepartementet) Arechavala-Lopez, Pablo; Sæther, Bjørn-Steinar; Marhuenda-Egea, Frutos; Sánchez-Jerez, Pablo; Uglem, Ingebrigt; 2015: Assessing the influence of salmon farming through total lipids, fatty acids, and trace elements in the liver and muscle of wild Saithe pollachius virens Puvanendran, Velmurugu; Toften, Hilde; Tveiten, Helge; Lein, Ingrid; Sæther, Bjørn-Steinar; Johnsen kasino express, Hanne; 2015: Høyere temperatur i tidlige livsstadier kan forbedre torskens vekst og kvalitet Sæther, Bjørn-Steinar; Uglem, Ingebrigt; Karlsen, Ørjan; Sánchez-Jerez, Pablo; 2016: Sameksistens mellom fiskeri og havbruk Uglem, Ingebrigt; Ulvan, Eva Marita; Toledo-Guedes, Kilian; Sæther, Bjørn-Steinar; 2017: Does a diet consisting of waste feed from salmon farming affect the taste of saithe (Pollachius virens L.)? Siikavuopio, Sten Ivar; Sæther, Bjørn-Steinar; Johnsen, Helge K.; Evensen, Tor Hatten; Knudsen, Rune; 2014: Temperature preference of juvenile Arctic charr originating from different thermal environments Svåsand, Terje; Albretsen, Jon; Asplin, Lars; Aure, Jan; Bang-Jensen, Britt; Bannister, Raymond; Bjørn, Pål Arne; Dahle, Geir; Ervik, Arne S; Fjelldal, Per-Gunnar*; Finstad, Bengt; Glover, Kevin; Grøsvik, Bjørn Einar; Hansen, Pia Kupka; Hansen, Tom; Heino roulette 2 column betting, Mikko; Husa, Vivian; Jansen gratis slots spill jockey, Peder Andreas; Jimenez, Daniel; Johnsen, Ingrid Askeland; Jørstad, Knut; Karlsbakk, Egil; Karlsen, Ørjan; Kristoffersen, Anja; Llinnares, Rosa Maria Serra; Madhun, Abdullah; Mortensen, Stein; Craig, Morton; Nilsen, Rune; Otterå, Håkon; Patel, Sonal; Sæther, Bjørn-Steinar; Samuelsen, Ole B.; Sandvik, Anne; Skardhamar, Jofrid; Skiftesvik, Anne Berit; Skilbrei, Ove; Skaala beste online casino top, Øystein; Skår, Cecilie; Stien, Lars H.; Uglem, Ingebrigt; van der Meeren, Terje; Wennevik, Vidar; 2014: Risikovurdering norsk fiskeoppdrett 2013 Sæther, Bjørn-Steinar; 2016: Levendelagring av villfanget fisk Kolarevic, Jelena; Espmark, Åsa Maria O.; Aas-Hansen, Øyvind; Terjesen, Bendik Fyhn; Sæther, Bjørn-Steinar; 2015: Real time monitoring of water quality and fish welfare in recirculation aquaculture systems (RAS). Conference Abstract p. 433 Sæther, Bjørn-Steinar; Brinker, Alexander; Carlsen, Kristian Tuff; Holm, Jørgen; 2015: When the shit hits the fan: diet composition, indigestible binders and fecal stability Siikavuopio, Sten Ivar; Knudsen, Rune; Amundsen, Per-Arne; Sæther, Bjørn-Steinar; James, Philip; 2013: Effects of high temperature on the growth of European whitefish (Coregonus lavaretus L.) Kolarevic, Jelena; Bundgaard, Dag Egil; Reiten, Britt Kristin Megård; Nerdal, Kristin Skei; Sæther, Bjørn-Steinar; 2015: The automatization of the water quality monitoring in recirculation aquaculture systems (RAS) Midling, Kjell Øyvind; Noble, Chris; Sæther, Bjørn-Steinar; 2013: Capture-based aquaculture at Nofima Norway, capturing the best of both worlds Sæther, Bjørn-Steinar; Noble, Chris; Humborstad, Odd Børre; Midling, Kjell Øyvind; 2013: Operational welfare indicators, weaning and growth of wild caught Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua L.) Bjørn, Pål Arne; Uglem, Ingebrigt; Sæther, Bjørn-Steinar; Dale slots casino free play slots, Trine; Kerwath, Sven; Økland, Finn; Nilsen, Rune; Aas, Kåre; Aas, Kåre; Tobiassen, Torbjørn; 2007: Videreføring av prosjektet "Behavioural responses in wild coastal cod exposed to salmon farms: possible effects of salmon holding water - a field and experimental study” Foss, Atle; Siikavuopio, Sten Ivar; Sæther, Bjørn-Steinar; Evensen, Tor Hatten; 2004: Effect of chronic ammonia exposure on growth in juvenile Atlantic cod Kolarevic, Jelena; Bundgaard, Dag Egil; Reiten, Britt Kristin Megård; Nerdal, Kristin Skei; Bink, Kees; Bouma, Peter; Frederiksen, Marco T.; Petersen, Paw; Linga, Jayasri; Abbott, Chris; Sæther, Bjørn-Steinar; 2014: Performance of the multi-sensor automated platform for continuous monitoring of the water quality in recirculation aquaculture systems (RAS) Siikavuopio, Sten Ivar; Sæther, Bjørn-Steinar; 2006: Effects of chronic nitrite exposure on growth in juvenile Atlantic cod,Gadus morhua Sæther, Bjørn-Steinar; 2014: Fôr til fisk og fôr til RAS: betydning av fôrets sammensetting for bannbehandling Gildberg, Asbjørn; Arnesen, Jan-Arne; Sæther, Bjørn-Steinar; Rauø, Jaran; Stenberg, Even; 2011: Angiotensin I-converting enzyme inhibitory activity in a hydrolysate of proteins from Northern shrimp (Pandalus borealis) and identification of two novel inhibitory tri-peptides Sæther, Bjørn-Steinar; 2013: Aquaculture in Norway Midling, Kjell Øyvind; Evensen, Tor Hatten; Humborstad, Odd Børre; Olsen, Stein Harris; Svalheim, Ragnhild Aven; Sæther, Bjørn-Steinar; 2016: Levende hyse og torsk fra snurpenot – muligheter for direkteleveranse, oppfôring, seleksjon og redskapstilpasninger Skybakmoen, Steinar; Siikavuopio, Sten Ivar; Sæther, Bjørn-Steinar; 2009: Coldwater RAS in an Arctic charr farm in Northern Norway Siikavuopio, Sten Ivar; Sæther, Bjørn-Steinar; Skybakmoen, Steinar; Uhlig, Christian; Haugland, Espen; 2009: Effects of a simulated short winter period on growth in wild caught Arctic charr (Salvelinus alpinus L.) held in culture Noble norsk casino careers, Chris; Sæther, Bjørn-Steinar; 2014: How can feed management contribute to sustainability? Challenges and future prospects Marhuenda-Egea, Frutos; Toledo-Guedes, Kilian; Sánchez-Jerez, Pablo; Ibanco-Canete, Ricardo; Uglem, Ingebrigt; Sæther, Bjørn-Steinar; 2015: A Metabolomic Approach to Detect Effects of Salmon Farming on Wild Saithe (Pollachius virens) Populations Sæther, Bjørn-Steinar; Christiansen, Jørgen Schou; Jobling, Malcolm; 1999: Gastrointestinal evacuation of particulate matter in polar cod, Boreogadus saida Midling, Kjell Øyvind; Sæther, Bjørn-Steinar; 2016: FBA, FoU, status og planer Sæther, Bjørn-Steinar; 2016: Oppsummering fôr-kartlegging Katalysatorene jeg studerer er mikroporøse, og er enten rent uorganiske materialer (zeolitter og zeotyper) eller organiske/uorganiske hybridmaterialer (Metall-organiske nettverkstrukturer, MOF). Forskningen min blir gjort i nært samarbeid med kolleger innen organisk og uorganisk syntese, avansert spektroskopi og teoretiske beregninger.
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